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Abstract
Many criticisms have been directed to Law No. 7 of 2012 on Social Conflict Intervention (SCIL) which was passed
by the parliament in April 2012. One of the criticisms is linked to a possibility of creating state violence. This paper 
reveals some implementation consequences of the Law No.7 of 2012 by adopting a scenario building approach. The
scenario building approach is a narrative or story that foresees a future of society, either in a positive or negative
condition. In this paper, the land conflict is one of notorious conflicts in Indonesia; it becomes a main narrative issue
of scenario building on Law No. 7 of 2012, particularly, the land conflict that is based on customary land issues.
Therefore, this paper has its main question: how does scenario building method reveal the consequences of Law No.
7 of 2012 in the case of land conflicts? The scenario building in this paper is based on the discourse analysis of media
social construction theory through the case of land conflict in Lampung Province.
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1. Land Conflict in Indonesia
Indonesian Social Development Paper by World Bank shows that the second highest level of conflict
cases in Indonesia is the land conflict, while criminal is at the top level [1]. According to Henry Rustandi 
Butarbutar, Head of Conflict Division of BPN (National Land Agency), in 2007, there were 2,615 land
conflicts and dispute cases, and in 2009, the conflicts increased up to 7,000 cases [2]. While according to
Head of BPN, Joyo Winoto, until January 2010, there were 9,471 cases of land disputes and conflicts in
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which 2,913 cases have not been resolved [3]. Even though, , most of the land 
conflicts have been resolved, civil society organizations mention different data: many unresolved land 
conflicts , land conflict between customary community and 
company or state owned enterprises (BUMN); those are not reported formally by the government. 
KPA(Consortium for Agrarian Reform) reported that there were 106 land conflicts in 2010 involving 
517,159 families in the conflict of 535, 197 hectares land; the incident caused 3 farmers killed, 4 farmers 
shot and 80 farmers arrested by the police [4]. In addition, 69,975 families were suffering because of land 
conflicts during 2011 on 472,048.44 hectares [5]. 
Those land conflicts were often handled by the state using means of violence and alleging the 
community members as law violators or criminals. In many cases, vertical land conflicts between 
communities against companies or state are transformed into horizontal conflicts among communities. 
The phenomena are followed with security guards or pamswakarsa recruited from people around the 
villages by a company. Hence, the land conflicts are basically mixed types of conflict, namely vertical-
horizontal land conflicts. This conflict dynamics is socially complicated. However, in some testimonial 
reports, the police  as state representatives  often stand to protect community members who are at the 
the security guards themselves. This happened in North Sumatera, between PT. 
Mazuma Agro Indonesia and the community when the police and pamswakarsa did violent actions [6] 
[7]. Due to the phenomena, what is the possible future of land conflict management under Law No. 7 of 
2012? 
1.1. Scenario Building 
Through the case of land conflict in Lampung, Indonesia, SCIL needs to be foreseen in its 
implementation by adopting the scenario building concept, whether it creates state violence or not. 
Scenarios are stories or narratives that foresee a future that might happen in society, including the reasons 
behind of positive or negative conditions, and the consequences of a state policy, collective action or 
system. It is not a method to reach consensus around a particular single concept of the future, but it is 
more to elaborate the political, social economic and cultural realities of a situation. As Mietzner and 
Reger pointed out, scenario is about strategy to see a possible future which contains uncertainty [8]. 
According to Alcamo, the basic elements of typical scenario are: 1) Description of step-wise changes in 
the future state of society and environment. 2) Driving forces, the major factors that influence the change 
described. 3) Base year. 4) Time horizon and time steps. 5) Storyline, a narrative description that 
highlights the scenario main features including the relationship with the driving force [9]. 
The scenario building on Law No.7 of 2012 in this paper is based on FGD and interview with 
members of some local communities during the field research in Mesuji and Tulang Bawang in 2010 and 
2011. The driving forces of SCIL implementation included the habitus of politics, court system quality, 
 possible futures basically are 
divided into positive and negative possible future. The positive future can instantly be traced from the 
situation when Law , whereas for 
the possible negative future, the Law No. 7 of 2012 creates a state violence. Before analyzing SCIL by 
using scenario building approach, this paper elaborates firstly the fundamental fallacy of SCIL and 
habitus  
1.2. The Fallacy of Law No. 7 of 2012  
Fundamentally, the perspective of conflict management explains that every social relationship, either 
in economics or politics, has a nature of conflict. Every human being and particular collective groups as a 
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social subject cannot deny reality of relative needs which are represented by subjective knowledge, 
interests and goals in shared social environment. The reality is obviously always relative and dynamic. 
Relative needs that lead to any social relationships are not directly towards a consensual condition, but 
through a process of dynamic interactions of diversity, disagreement and competition from each social 
, the dynamic interaction process creates substantively the vary conflicts 
phenomena in the arena of social life, such as markets, schools, corporations and offices. 
Based on the philosophy mentioned above, conflict is a social relation dynamic between and among 
social subjects within a particular social arena. In this perspective, the conflict is not always a situation of 
physical violence between social subjects. The practice of violence has different dimensions, though it 
can intersect with the phenomenon of conflict. However, simplistically, Social Conflict Intervention Law 
(SCIL) Interven
conflict is a clash with the physical violence between two or more groups of pe  [10]. The 
on conflict is possibly creating a state violence. Through article 1, paragraph 2, SCIL 




If the SCIL is translated into a policy, the conflicts between civil society groups and private sectors, in 
which the government involves, can be directly interpreted as a threat to the national security. Moreover, 
the Article 30 of SCIL permits governors and regents/ mayors to ask military resources to deal with 
s article is possibly utilized for a benefit of protecting narrow interests of certain 
political and economic groups. For example, a conflict between indigenous farmers and a private 
company or state-
national or regional security. In many cases, by looking at the behaviour of the state over the years, small 
farmers or indigenous communities are subordinated by state violence. 
In fact, the phenomenon of conflict is not always manifested by the practice of physical violence. It 
can occur in both physical violence and peaceful practice. Whereas, the SCIL states that every conflict 
includes a clash and a physical violence. The physical violence is a social practice that is created through 
intentionally uses force to achieve the needs of the social subject. The phenomenon of social conflict can 
be affixed to physical violence when social subjects enter the simultaneous process. Violence has always 
been a constraint for each conflict to reach consensual condition. Therefore, the communities with a 
strong established social structures and cultural systems tend to encourage their institutions to transform 
conflict into a consensual condition. 
In the modern world, that institution is called local wisdom in the customary structures; the position of 
customary structures becomes sociologically very important in the settlement of social conflicts. 
Although, SCIL in Article 37 includes local wisdom of the traditional institutions as part of conflict 
resolution mechanism, there is no substantive emphasis that social conflicts caused by state policy could 
be solved by traditional mechanisms. Instead, it emphasizes that all social conflicts are only product of 
interest conflicts among communities, as stated in Article 5. Even though it is not rare for power groups, 
such big company and political elites to often utilize civic groups to divert the vertical dimension of 
conflict into horizontal social conflict. This inadvertence of regulations on the practice of SCIL 
potentially creates a deteriorating conflict which transforms into the form of collective violence. 
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1.3. Habitus of Political Elites 
The second issue related to SCIL implementation is the habitus or political habit of central and local 
governments. Normatively, SCIL, through article 9, encourages local governments that become powerful 
actors in social conflict management to follow the principle of good governance, to enforce the laws and 
to preserve the cultural valuesand local wisdom. However, the article 9 can be possibly ignored or 
deleted due to political practice habits which are characterized dominantly by narrow interests, 
unresponsive to public voice, and oligarchy. There are still many political elites at governmental structure 
that favour economic capital groups in a land conflict between communities and private sectors. They 
often ignore people  aspiration, but they advocate a capital interest.  
Habitus is a concept about social practiced created by Pierre Bourdieu [11]. Habitus means a 
dialectical phenomenon that concurrently structures and is structured by process of historical realities; it 
habit-forming practices 
and thoughts that connect to the strategic likelihoods opened to individuals and strata in a given historical 
moment [12]. The habitus of elites at local governments can be observed, too from their choices to use 
violence to deal with various cases of conflict, such as that when the local governments have chosen state 
violence option to handle the cases of land conflict in Mesuji, Bima, Jambi and other places of Indonesia. 
The reality of political power in Indonesia, the habitus of both central and local, is still negative, such as 
alignments that often happened on specific groups who benefit themselves, making security as a business 
and ignoring the aspirations of grass root people in many issues of public policy [13]. Therefore, the 
combination of SCIL materials and habitus of political elites in Indonesian government will be able to 
create a state violence. 
2. Land Conflict Management 
Theoretically, conflict management aims to prevent any forms of violence during the conflict 
dynamics in order to create more opportunities of peaceful dialogue [14-17] However, Pruitt and Rubin 
point out that conflict management in real conflict dynamics can be developed in various forms of 
strategies, namely contending, avoidance, withdrawal, compromise and problem solving [18]. In an ideal 
concept of conflict management, a problem solving strategy should be carried on by all conflicting parties 
when other strategies seemed to be non productive. Non-productive conflict strategy can be seen through 
the destructive effects, such as protracted violent conflict, death, injury, dysfunction of social order and 
environmental damage.  
According to Zartman [17], when conflict management is undertaken by government, basically, it goes 
to the concept of governance. Regarding with the governance as a conflict management, Zartman pointed 
allocating, submerging, adjudicating, repressing) [17]. Repressing would be a violent exercise of state by 
considering some crucial conditions, such as to stop communal violent actions that cannot be settled 
down by peace process. In peace and conflict studies, the exercise of violence by state can be allowed to 
handle conflict situation, but it has to be controlled publicly. However, the state violence is often being 
employed by political elites in power structure to gain a section interest. Therefore, repressing  as one of 
conflict management approaches  is abused.  
Land conflict management by government means the governance process of managing land conflict 
between two or more social-subjects, namely individual and collective groups, by deploying a certain 
institutional framework and habitus of politics. Institutional framework is a system that contains legal 
laws, regulations, mechanism or procedures, custom and norm; while habitus of politics is the practice of 
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elites and leaders, such as mayor legislator or police that usually used in power structure of state. Habitus 
determines a political approach of elites in power structure in handling conflict whether it will take in the 
form of violence or not. Hence, the conflict management as governance basically engages institutional 
framework and habitus of political elites in power structure.  
Relating to institutional framework which can be showed by the legal framework or laws, Indonesian 
land conflict management has several laws that regulate directly or indirectly land conflicts, namely Law 
No. 5 of 1960 on Basic Agrarian Law (BAL), Law No. 22 of 2012 on Land Acquisition for Public 
Interest, Law No. 20 of 1961 on Cancelation of Land Rights, Presidential Decree No. 55 of 1993 and 
Presidential Regulation No. 36 of 2005, jo. No 65/2006. Some related laws to land conflict management 
can also be seen at Law No. 41 of 1999 on Forestry, Law No. 18 of 2003 on Plantation, Law No. 7 of 
2004 on Water Resources, Law No. 27 of 2007 on The Management of Coastal Zones and Small Islands 
and Law No. 4 of 2009 on Mineral and Coal. Currently, SCIL becomes new institutional framework of 
land conflict management since this law can include any social conflicts, including land issues. 
Habitus 
management mostly occur in the form of political violence. In such an authoritarian regime, political 
violence of state can be seen clearly. As the case of Indonesia, during New Order era (1969-1998), 
according to Susan, the regime often undertook political violence to force people to obey and follow 
central government policy, such as what had happened in Aceh during 1979-2006 [19]. 
The main purpose of political violence is to guard interests of particular groups of elites in power 
structure. Political violence obviously never obeys and grasps democratic principles, such as peace 
dialogue and negotiation mechanism. Therefore, John Keane points out that the exercise of violence by a 
government has to be democratised. He proposed ten rules to democratize violence. The ten rules consist 
of; 1) the motives and context of the violent. 2) Exercise caution and heap doubt upon the schemes and 
and call for the hardest possible remedies. 3) Civility and freedom 
ernment. 6) Cultivation 
of public awareness on political dilemmas in relation to when the means of violence can be deployed. 7) 
Any means usage of communication to publicise acts of violence to debate publicly. 8) Conscientious 
testing on ethical aspects in public space in order not to cause a representative symbolic violence. 9) 
[20]. 
What Keane [20] stated on exercise of violence by considering democracy principles is an ideal 
concept. Practically, the exercise of violence by state often happens without following democratic values 
and mechanism. Although Indonesia is a democratic state, violence is undergone by the government 
without asking public opinions. Instead of using democratic values and mechanism, the government uses 
 
3. Context of Land Conflict in Lampung Province 
This paper discusses briefly the context of land conflicts in Lampung in order to give a clear setting for 
the scenario building of SCIL. The province of Lampung is situated in the southwest region of Sumatra 
Island, Indonesia, covering a total area of 35,376.50 square km (about 1.74% of Indonesian area), 
bounded by the Indian Ocean to the west, Bengkulu and South Sumatra to the north, Java Sea to the east, 
and Sunda Straits as the southern border. This province was formed in 1964 under Law No. 14 of 1964; it 
has 12 regencies (kabupaten) and 2 municipalities (kotamadya).  
Lampung is one of provinces in Indonesia that deals with exacerbated violent land conflicts. 
According to Joko Umar, the Vice Governor of Lampung, since 2008 there are averagely 40 land conflict 
cases every year in Lampung. However, the capacity of government to solve the conflict is not optimal 
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yet. Umar states that the government could only handle 8-10 land conflict cases [21]. During 1995-2005, 
there were 91 land conflict cases on 427,964.5 hectares of land with 133,738 victims. It is estimated that 
80 percents of those cases are between communities and companies. Civil society elements perceive that 
the government does not have a good will to seek the problem solving for those land conflicts. As Iwan 
Nurdin, the Secretary General 
government is still lack of commitment to handle seriously the land conflicts. Moreover, the 
f land 
[22]. For more detailed data of land conflicts in Lampung Province see the table 1.  
Table 1. Land Conflict Cases in Lampung Province 
No District/Municipality  Cases Victims Hectares 
1 South Lampung 24 34,065 98,500.15 
2 Tulang Bawang 17 22,547 93,630.00 
3 North Lampung 11 4,347 23,902.50 
4 East Lampung 11 12,240 60,335.15 
5 Central Lampung 10 8,265 46,005.88 
6 Way Kanan 8 9,294 43,571.00 
7 West Lampung 5 38,700 61,500.00 
8 Bandar Lampung 4 1,284 470,00 
9 Tanggamus 1 86 50,00 
 TOTAL 91 133,738 427,964.53 
Source: Dewan Rakyat Lampung [23] 
 
Chief of Regional Police (Kapolda Lampung), Brigjen Pol Jodie Rooseto ensures that Lampung is 
dealing with most difficult land conflict cases. He testifies that there are currently land conflict cases 
between 11 big companies and communities in Lampung [24]. Companies recruit local people from 
around villages as pamswakarsa (the acronym of Pasukan Pengamanan Masyarakat Swakarsa / Civil 
Defense Forces created by Society). Some local community members in Mesuji and Tulang Bawang 
testify that pamswakarsa is recruited by company to blur the conflict between local community and 
company to become a social conflict of inter-community. Most of big companies in Lampung create 
pamswakarsa, such as PT. Silva Inhutani Lampung and PT. Barat Selatan Makmur Investindo. Civil 
society elements, such as AGRA Lampung (the Alliance of Agrarian Reform Movement), argue that the 
recruitment of pamswakarsa from the members of community can create a horizontal conflict [25]. 
Pamswakarsa will claim that they have a right for the status of land use in Lampung. One of customary 
land. After the protest, we fought with pamswakarsa. We chose to draw back to our homes after knowing 
some members of pamswakarsa were neighbou
conflict between community and company is blurred intentionally through a horizontal conflict. When the 
land conflicts are blurred by horizontal conflict, SCIL can likely be used by the government to intervene 
by considering it as a social conflict phenomenon.  
4. Scenarios Building on SCIL Implementation 
At the first week of January 2025, the land conflicts in Lampung between some companies and local 
involvement of Pamswakarsa. The horizontal violence of land conflict among the communities spread 
over in Mesuji, Tulang Bawang, North Lampung and South Lampung. There is an insecure situation 
within society. Social prejudice, intimidation, armed clashes among communities and cycle of violence 
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have torn the Lampung Province into a deep social chaos. Hundreds people are injured and thousands 
people become refugees. The issue of land conflict between company and local communities is sunken by 
ethno and religious sentiments. Governor, with the approval of Provincial House of Representative 
(DRPD I), is at provincial level (SCIL article 15 (3)). The conflict situation 
applies until 90 days maximum (SCIL article 22). The Governor of Lampung Province, Regents of each 
regency, Police and military force consent to terminate the horizontal violence based on SCIL.  
4.1. Scenario 1: State Violence  
Due to the violent horizontal conflict situation, during the first week of horizontal violent conflict, the 
Governor of Lampung requests TNI (Indonesian Military Forces) to support POLRI (Police of Republic 
of Indonesia) in handling horizontal violence of land conflicts (SCIL, article 33 (2)). TNI is under the 
coordination of POLRI (Article 34 (1)). The main duty of POLRI and TNI is to undertake peacemaking 
process through a persuasion and or means of violence (force). The goal of peace making process by 
POLRI and TNI is to deescalate violent actions, to prepare reconciliation between community-
pamswakarsa and local community and to undertake emergency rescue for the conflict survivors (SCIL 
article 32). The Governor of Lampung creates two special committees; first committee aims to handle 
refugees and the second one aims to undertake reconciliation program. In order to prevent conflicts of 
horizontal violence from getting worse, the governor issues a policy that restricts and closes areas of four 
regencies (SCIL, article 27).  
Violent conflicts between Pamswakarsa community and local community have been escalating during 
the second week of January 2025. More people are injured and killed. Pamswakarsa community builds 
their base around plantation areas and villages near the companies, while local community controls more 
villages since they are more dominant in numbers. The two conflicting groups mobilize the members to 
attack and to retaliate. Pamswakarsa personnel are more skilful in attacking and using homemade 
weapons because they have got a semi-military training from company and the police resort command. 
The issue of ethno and religious sentiments is worsening the conflict situation.  
The power structure of the Lampung Province is surely dominated by political Elites who have a 
network of interests with the companies. All of regents in Lampung also have investments and businesses 
in plantation companies. Meanwhile, POLRI, during the period of land conflicts between company and 
local community, gets financial support from companies to secure their forest and plantation areas. The 
outbreak of horizontal violent conflict becomes a momentum for political elites to blur the root causes of 
land conflict between companies and local communities. The interests of the political elite and police are 
creating un-neutral implementation of social conflicts intervention. The mission of peacemaking has been 
deviated into a movement of securing political elites interest. In practice, the joint security forces between 
POLRI and TNI are doing more protection to the Pamswakarsa community. In the fourth week of 
January 2025, some members of the local community are shot by the police members. 
The alignments of POLRI and TNI stimulate local . In the first week of February 
2025 the local communities mobilize the members to some plantation areas which become the basis of 
Pamswakarsa community. The local communities express their anger by destroying the company's office 
and police posts/offices in some locations and expelling Pamswakarsa community. The local 
communities occupy the plantation and forest of some companies
government to solve the main problem of land conflict between community and company. However, in 
t prefers to focus on the issue of occupation. 
The governor requests POLRI and TNI to undergo a special operation for securing the public facility, 
national economic interest, and conflict survivors. POLRI justifies the special operation with the criminal 
law which considers the occupation as an unlawful action. The special operation is undergone jointly 
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The special operation by POLRI and TNI is undergone in the fourth week of February 2025. There is 
an issue within local community that the special operation is financed by some companies. Therefore, the 
upying the 
plantation areas until there is a clear problem solving for the land conflict. Following the local community 
resistance, POLRI and TNI start using means of violence, such as rubber bullet and tear gas. The special 
operation personnel force the local community to leave the plantation areas that belong to companies. At 
the same time, Pamswakarsa community also attacks the local community. The special operation gets 
successful in forcing local community to withdraw from the plantation areas. Dozens of local community 
members are killed and hundreds are injured. However, the local community never gives up for their 
grievances. The state violence is continually created by the government. One of community leaders states 
to the mass media that, obviously, the government is going to murder them all.  
4.2. Scenario 2: Conflict Transformation 
After the local election in 2024, Lampung is governed by transformational leaderships at regencies and 
provincial levels. Political elites in power structure nurture democratic governance in which the people  
aspiration are listened and accommodated. The governor always prioritizes a deliberative process before 
creating and implementing any policies. POLRI at provincial to resort levels, court and attorney 
institution enforce the law indiscriminately. When land conflicts in four regencies have changed into 
horizontal violence in the second week of January 2025, the governor holds an emergency meeting with 
all regents, mayors, DPRD I and other local government institutions. The meeting is to reveal the problem 
root of the horizontal violence. The government has reached a common understanding that horizontal 
violence is fundamentally rooted by the land conflict between company and local community. Based on 
this understanding, the governor creates three special committees.  
The first committee is aimed to undertake an emergency rescue to conflict survivors and refugees 
(SCIL, article 32. This committee consists of social department, Satuan Polisi Pamong Praja (Civil 
Service Police Unit), NGOs and BPBD (Regional Disaster Management Agency). The second committee 
is to undertake peacemaking program in order to stop the violent conflict escalation (SCIL, article 33). 
The committee consists of POLRI and TNI. And, the third committee is aimed to undertake a 
reconciliation process and peace talk for resolving the problem root of violent conflict. The special 
s, both provincial and local levels, and customary 
institutions (SCIL, article 40). The Governor of Lampung Province becomes the supervisor directly to the 
three committees.  
The emergency rescue committee is working effectively by distributing aids to conflict survivors. The 
committee gives a hand to all communities without discrimination. The survivors of horizontal conflict 
can be saved from the violent conflict escalation. POLRI and TNI implement the peacemaking mission 
neutrally. The leaders of POLRI and TNI reject gratification and bribery from some companies in order to 
keep the neutrality of committee. The committee is able to convince the local communities that the 
government is now trying to solve the problem of land conflict. The peacemaking committee can de-
escalate the violent conflict into a stable and safe situation. The Governor efficiently catches the ripe 
moment of conflict de-escalation to find a way out of the problem. The mechanism used is dialogue and 
negotiations involving all conflicting parties, including companies. Committee on reconciliation and 
peaceful dialogue immediately invites the local community, Pamswakarsa community, related companies, 
BPN (National Agrarian Agency) and other governmental agencies. 
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In the first week of February 2025, the reconciliation and peaceful dialogue committee is successful in 
reconciling pamswakarsa community and local community. The government, with the help of NGOs, will 
undertaking a negation and peaceful dialogue between companies and local community. The government 
mediates the land conflicts with the principle of neutrality. The negotiation and peaceful dialogue needs a 
long time since the problem root of land conflicts are complicated. However, the government has a 
commitment to find the problem solving in land conflict through a transparent negotiation and peaceful 
dialogue.  
5. Conclusion  
conflict intervention. Furthermore considering the habitus 
structure, which is characterized by the practice of undemocratic governance, SCIL is possibly utilized to 
blur the problem root of land conflicts between local community and company. Therefore, the possible 
future of land conflicts in Indonesia will be managed by a state violence rather than conflict 
transformation.  
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